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Abstract
Pandemics are imbued with the politics of bordering. For centuries, border closures and restrictions
on foreign travelers have been the most persistent and pervasive means by which states have
responded to global health crises. The ubiquity of these policies is not driven by any clear scientific
consensus about their utility in the face of myriad pandemic threats. Instead, we show they are
influenced by public opinion and preexisting commitments to invest in the symbols and structures
of state efforts to control their borders, a concept we call border orientation. Prior to the COVID19 pandemic, border orientation was already generally on the rise world-wide. This trend has made
it convenient for governments to “contain” the virus by externalizing it, rather than taking costly
but ultimately more effective domestic mitigation measures. We argue that the pervasive use of
external border controls in the face of the coronavirus reflects growing anxieties about border
control and border security in the modern international system. To a great extent, fears relating to
border security have become a resource in domestic politics – a finding that does not bode well for
designing and implementing effective public health policy.
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Pandemic Response as Border Politics
“It stopped COVID, it stopped everything.”
-Donald Trump, inspecting a section of concrete wall
on the US-Mexican border, 23 June 2020 1
Pandemics are imbued with the politics of bordering. For centuries, border closures and
restrictions on foreign travelers have been the most persistent and pervasive means by which
states have responded to global health crises. The ubiquity of these policies is not driven by any
clear scientific consensus about their utility in the face of myriad pandemic threats. Instead it is a
reflection of their palliative impact on societies predisposed to express concern about that which
is foreign in times of crisis. In this way, the pervasive use of external border controls in the face
of the coronavirus reflects growing anxieties about border control and border security in the
modern international system.
Pandemics reveal national character under radical uncertainty. Leaders may decide to
rewrite their crisis playbook or may deploy well-worn tropes that have provided reassurance in
the past. The COVID-19 crisis has supplied plenty of evidence of the latter. Under uncertainty –
and despite the recommendations of global health authorities – states that had already chosen to
invest in border security have, on average, doubled down on that response to the pandemic. The
politics that produce border security as a proper response to external threats have guided the
COVID-19 response in many states as well. In this respect, pandemics – no less than migration
waves or terrorist attacks – involve border politics.
As evidence of this claim, we analyze states’ initial policy responses to the coronavirus
spread. Borrowing from the interdependence literature, we consider policies of external versus

1

Quoted in Time Magazine, available at https://time.com/5858294/trump-border-wall-coronavirus/.
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internal adjustment. Policies can focus on externalizing the costs of pandemic control (by
restricting travel, closing borders, and the like) and/or they can internalize these costs (by
regulating social distance, contact tracing, regulating where and how many people gather). In
responding to the coronavirus pandemic, states have enacted a panoply of protective policies, but
none more pervasive or persistent as international border controls. 2 Political leaders clearly
attempt to frame the options and to manipulate public opinion. For some, borders become a
political resource and securing them is the policy of choice. But such impulses are conditioned
by the underlying script states follow when they embrace or filter The Other.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a rare opportunity to examine national politics in response to
a (nearly) exogenous transnational shock. Pandemic politics provide subtle but suggestive
evidence of international borders’ important domestic role. As border scholars, we are especially
concerned with how pre-existing routines of border governance influence the balance between
policies of internalization and externalization. The initial policy mix is highly informative for
understanding how international bordering is used to cope with major transnational shocks.
States that have invested in the symbols and structures of border security are likely to respond to
pandemic with international travel restrictions, border closure, and potentially even international
defection. And though there is no necessary tradeoff, the comfort they take in externalizing and
scapegoating may undercut the national will to fight a pandemic from within.
For these reasons, we examine responses to the coronavirus pandemic through the lens of
border politics. The first section demonstrates how common such externalization strategies are
historically. Cooperative international efforts germinated in the nineteenth century but have been
notoriously difficult to maintain. Hardening international borders in the face of perceived health
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threats is historically states’ first (and sometimes only) move. The second section makes the case
that domestic publics tend to be amenable to externalization strategies, and many politicians find
it easy to oblige. We argue that this urge to close borders is often better characterized by political
calculations made at a time of uncertainty and fueled by fear, rather than responsive to the
scientific evidence alone.
The third section is the empirical heart of the paper. Here we present a preliminary foray
into the evidence connecting border governance, internal mitigation policies, and externalization
through border restrictions. We suggest that preexisting scripts for security tend to resurface in
the face of pandemic uncertainty: physical border investments are strongly associated with
border restrictions in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, but are weakly, perhaps even
negatively associated with stringent internal mitigation strategies. These trends – and the
variation around them – inform a much richer understanding of the broad ramifications of
domestic and international border politics. We conclude that the coronavirus crisis underscores a
need to refocus the international relations literature on broad issues of border governance
currently salient in many parts of the world. 3 In terms of policy, closed borders and unilateral
action are poor substitutes for international cooperation and meaningful domestic health policies.

I. Border Control and Closure: The Historical Pandemic Policy Default

Pandemic threats require sudden and consequential decision-making by state leaders.
Which types of policies are most likely to reduce the spread of the disease? Should these actions
be taken internally, at international borders, or both? How are the public health benefits weighed
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against their economic impact? The answer to these questions should depend first and foremost
on the nature of the biological threat, its etiology, mode of transmission, fatality rate, and the
capability of modern medicine to reduce its impact on the affected. At the time of outbreak,
however, policy makers are operating with incomplete information as the scientific community
works rapidly to better understand the threat. As a result, state leaders reach for tools through
which they can most readily assert authority. For the past several centuries, this has meant
controls at territorial borders.
The historical record provides clear evidence that pandemic responses have been
concentrated at the territorial borders of political authority. The term “quarantine,” for example,
originates from the Italian quaranta giorni or 40 days, the amount of time foreign ships were
required to anchor offshore during the 14th century outbreak of the bubonic plague. Italian city
states continued to use systems of armed patrol ships, observation posts and horse patrols to
enforce disease controls that lasted until the 1850s. 4 Prior to the 19th century, countries often
responded to pandemics through unilaterally applied and often redundant quarantine measures,
whose inefficiency threatened international trade routes. 5 Two devastating cholera outbreaks in
the mid nineteenth century and outbreaks of yellow fever in North America were also notable for
their emphasis on combatting transmission through focused measures taken at the edges of each
state’s territorial jurisdiction.
This pattern of responding to pandemics through increased border control has persisted
for centuries. A series of international conferences and conventions aimed at coordinating
containment efforts focused on the use of quarantine measures, despite a dearth of scientific
information to inform whether such measures would prove effective. Four international public
4
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health organizations were formed over the century between 1850 and 1951, 6 marking a new
scientific and public health information sharing and monitoring function but retaining their atthe-border focus. 7 Almost always, these measures prioritized state authority. This “Westphalian
system of public health” coordinated quarantines to protect trade rather than public health and
was carefully calibrated to protect territorial sovereignty. 8 Border regions remained focal for
pandemic control, even though the effectiveness of these measures remained speculative.
Some militarized approaches have moderated over the years. For the most part states
have abandoned the extreme cordons sanitaires – the use of military troops to contain disease at
the border – used by France in the Pyrenees in 1821 in the face of an aggressive fever, at the
border between Poland and Russia in 1918 to stop typhus from spreading west, and most recently
during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014. 9 Diseases thought to be uncontrollable were
not targeted by border measures. Richard Cooper relates how the international organizations of
the 20th Century largely ignored diseases that could not be quarantined, in addition to those like
smallpox, that were assumed to be universal. 10
Some scholars have observed important turning points in the latter part of the 20th
century. The League of Nations’ specialized agencies were reputed to have performed better than
its security organs, but beyond some localized successes (notable for their time) had limited
health impact. 11 In 1948 the World Health Organization (WHO) was founded and in 1951 it

1902: Pan American Sanitary Bureau; 1907: Office International d’Hygiène Publique; 1923: Health Organization
of the League of Nations; and 1948: World Health Organization. See Arhin-Tenkorang and Conceição 2003; Fidler
1999.
7
Arhin-Tenkorang and Conceição 2003.
8
Fidler 2004.
9
Donald G. McNeil Jr., “Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon Off Ebola-Racked Areas.” New
York Times, August 12, 2014. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/science/using-a-tactic-unseen-in-acentury-countries-cordon-off-ebola-racked-areas.html.
10
Cooper 2001.
11
Pedersen 2007.
6
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passed International Sanitary Regulations which created a single but narrow set of rules for
quarantine. 12 The idea was again to control disease with a minimum of interference with world
travel and trade. 13 These rules were expanded into the International Health Regulations (IHR) in
1969 14 and again in 2005 15 to cover a growing range of diseases and risks. These rules also
called on WHO members to buttress public health capabilities at ports and airports “in ways that
are commensurate with … public health risks and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic and trade.” 16 Notably, the IHR has had difficulty anticipating the internal
measures that would be appropriate for novel public health threats.
Multilateral accomplishments in pandemic control were modest for most of the 20th
century. The eradication of smallpox, which was responsible for some 300 deaths world-wide
during the 20th century, was not small feat but was more of a “Third World Intervention” led by
the superpowers than a broader cooperative response. 17 Not until the AIDS epidemic of the late
1980s and the SARS outbreak of 2003 can interstate organizations be said to have actively
promulgated internal measures to combat novel pandemics, often at the behest of non-state
actors. 18 Development support for domestic pandemic control replaced some of the singular
emphasis on international borders as a control strategy. The WHO’s more active role signaled to
some observers a turning point. According to David Fidler, “The SARS case study not only
illuminates governance shifts in public health but helps highlight changes that may be occurring

Stowman 1952.
Fidler 2004, 33.
14
World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (1969): Third Annotated Edition. Available at
https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/224469.
12
13

15
World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005). Select provision available at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK143718/
16
International Health Regulations (2005), Article 2.
17
See the Cold War context described in Manela 2010.
18
See for example the discussion in Elbe 2010.
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to the general structure and dynamics of international relations in the era of globalization.” 19
Even so, no state has surrendered or even pooled significantly its sovereignty over public health.
Some even go as far as Indonesia to assert “viral sovereignty” – the right to any medical
developments that are made on the basis of a flu strain originating within their territorial
jurisdiction. 20 Clearly, and in light of recent allegations of Chinese noncooperation and USA’s
withdrawal from the WHO, it is premature to pronounce the death of a “Westphalian” model of
pandemic policy response.
Almost every analysis of the global response to pandemics mentions state sovereignty
and social sensitivities over public health issues. Hygiene, norms of contact, trust in science, and
the personal rights and privacy are often fraught social issues. And yet disease control may
require domestically costly changes in beliefs and behavior. Lack of (or resistance to) scientific
knowledge has made it easier to rely on border controls than internal mitigation strategies We
believe a case can be made for the attractions of border security in case of COVID-19, especially
as we will argue, for states invested in a narrative of the need for defense at the border.
II. The Case of COVID-19
Border policies have been a big part of the response to containing “viruses that know no
boundaries.” But why? In this section we set the stage for an answer. Our central claim is that
despite the intensification of globalization, and (often) despite scientific evidence, unilateral
border control is a very tempting tool for sovereign states to wield in the face of a pandemic. A
remarkable 186 countries responded to the contemporary coronavirus with external border
restrictions, targeting travel from an average of 163 countries. 21 By contrast, only 127 countries

Fidler 2004, 8.
Elbe 2010, 171.
21
Cheng et al. 2020.
19
20
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have enacted social distancing provisions, and often with much weaker enforcement. 22 Land
borders have also been particularly focal. By our count, 92 countries had fully or partially closed
their land borders by March 24. Even the internal borders of the European Union saw a return to
border controls rare since the establishment of the Schengen Zone. 23 Rhetorical bordering is also
on the rise with several state leaders speculating about the foreign origin of the virus, often in
derogatory terms.
Such an overwhelming response might be understandable, if science spoke with a clear
voice about border restrictions. However, the choice to institute border controls and closures are
not generally driven by the data. A review of the scientific evidence available before the
COVID-19 outbreak suggests that border controls, as they are generally implemented, are a
rather ineffective way to control pandemics. 24 Most of these studies demonstrate that controls at
the border must be implemented very early in the spread of the pandemic – often well before the
available evidence clearly indicates a threat. Studies have shown that social distancing is more
effective than border controls for delaying the peak of pandemic infections. 25 There may be a
limited case for small isolated island states such as New Zealand 26 or Taiwan, but border closure
alone has not been shown to be effective and has been recommended against by the World
Health Organization. 27 In short, even though travel bans and border restrictions are of limited

Ibid.
For a list of notifications, see European Commission, “Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control.” Available
at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-bordercontrol_en.
24
Bier 2020.
25
Cacciapaglia and Sannino 2020.
26
Boyd et al. 2017.
27
See WHO, https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/13/world-health-organization-don-t-expect-travel-bans-to-beatcoronavirus. See Bier 2020.
22
23
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utility – very stringent ones at best buying a week or so to put domestic measures in place 28 –
they are the policy of choice in most countries around the world.
Pandemics and the Problem of Uncertainty
Why reach for border restrictions? One reason is that pandemics almost always introduce
radical uncertainty into decision making. Experience bears this out. The emergence of the novel
H1N1 virus compounded a list of unknowns: the scale of the problem, the range of (initially)
small-scale trade-offs, uncertainty around detection and treatment, and of course the probability
that modest numbers of cases will result in widespread outbreak. 29 And what is learned from
previous experience is not always relevant across the range of pandemic cases; influenzas alone
involve so much genetic variation that it is difficult to predict their behavior, leading virologists
to characterize pandemic influenzas as “certain uncertainties.” 30 Importantly, uncertainty has
consequences for whether, when, and which policy actions are taken. Uncertainty was probably a
central reason for official decisional paralysis in the Ebola crisis, for example. 31
Then there are the uncertainties introduced by governance structures and policy
communication. Whether uncertainty is acknowledged can differ across governance levels,
illustrated by the confusion between federal state and local authorities in the United States,
Mexico and Brazil, not to mention among the member states of the EU and the European
Commission. 32 Communicating uncertainty itself is a sensitive policy problem: to frankly admit
uncertainty can undermine public confidence. 33 One study found that the communication of
Wells et al. 2020 conclude that despite being some of the strictest in the world, China’s “border control measures,
such as airport screening and travel restrictions, have …likely slowed the rate of exportation from mainland China to
other countries, but are insufficient to contain the global spread of COVID-19.” [Italics added.]
29
Reflecting on H1N1, see Lipsitch et al. 2009.
30
Morens and Taubenberger 2011.
31
Karlsen and Kruke 2018; Leduc and Liu 2020.
32
Versluis, van Asselt, and Kim 2019.
33
Backus and Little forthcoming; Driedger, Maier, and Jardine 2018.
28
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uncertainty undermined collective action by “personalizing” responses to pandemic risks. 34
Others have emphasized that the first-order problems associated with scientific and policy
uncertainty are compounded when they reverberate throughout the economy, 35 rendering the
assessment of trade-offs even more problematic.
International borders are a handy heuristic for decision-making under uncertainty. They
are focal and represent authoritative national power. Restricting them tends to impose lower
costs on residents than internal restrictions on movement or business closures. Border restrictions
are in this sense a good political bet for most leaders: they are fast and frugal. 36

Border Anxiety – a New Pandemic?
Why then do states decide to respond to the inherent uncertainty pandemics present by
limiting cross border movement? Why and under what conditions are border restrictions
considered a prudent policy choice? One possibility is that publics and politicians have been
priming a narrative of “dangerous others;” now, contagious foreign disease is just one more
example of the broad and deep “border anxieties” that we have seen evidenced across a spectrum
of issues over the past few decades. 37 This anxiety has been on display, for example, in debates
in the United Nations General Assembly, where border issues are drastically on the rise as a
proportion of all official public discourse, and has trended decisively negative over the past

Davis 2019.
Baker et al. 2020.
36
This phrase comes from management decision making under uncertainty by pairwise comparison (Luan, Reb, and
Gigerenzer 2019), but seems an appropriate description in this context as well.
37
For a discussion relating to migration, see Almond 2016.
34
35
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decade. 38 It is possible that the general anxiety around non-state forces at the border has simply
been reproduced as a motivated response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Border anxieties are also reflected in changes to the built environment along international
borders. It is well known that states have constructed walls and fences along these zones. 39
Border crossings increasingly bristle with the infrastructural capacity to filter a broad range of
threats – from smuggled goods, to unwanted migrants, to local militias and neighboring
militaries. Land borders provide a stark visual impression of this development. Figure 1 displays
the thickening of filtering capacity at the US-Mexican border over two decades, but the trend is
world-wide. Satellite and high-altitude imagery reveal the uneven but unmistakable build up
official buildings, gates and barriers, and pull-out lanes where pedestrians and vehicles can be
held for inspection. 40

Figure 1: Example of the build-up of “filtering capacity” at the US-Mexican border near Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, 1995,
2002, 2010, 2015. Images from Google Earth, at 27.5972898,-99.536867. Average border orientation scores (discussed
below) range from approximately 0.8 in 2002 to 2.2 in 2015.

The erection of walls, police stations, and filtering infrastructure at interstate borders
demonstrates how focal borders have become for enacting national security policies. The concept
of border orientation helps to summarize this trend over time and space. 41 It taps the extent to
which the State is committed to filtering the movement of goods and people as they move into

Simmons and Shaffer 2019.
Carter and Poast 2015; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Avdan and Gelpi 2017.
40
Simmons and Kenwick 2020.
41
Ibid.
38
39
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and out of their territory. Border orientation ranges from very permissive, where few means are
taken to project control of state borders, to very controlling, where countries make large
investments to assert control over ports of entry and the border region. Like many political traits,
border orientation is latent and cannot be observed directly; it can, however, be inferred based on
the physical investments manifest in the built environment. In our previous work, we have
generated an estimate of border orientation using a latent variable modeling framework based on:
(1) whether a country has built inspections facilities along roads crossing international borders; 42
(2) whether a country disproportionately polices its borders relative to the interior region; and (3)
whether a country has built border walls facing its neighbors. 43 The scores generated by a latent
model of observed infrastructural investments represent a commitment to display authority at the
border, with higher score representing more controlling border orientations.
Over the past twenty years, countries have increasingly adopted controlling orientations,
reflecting a concern about real and perceived threats across international borders. As displayed in
Figure 2, we estimate that average border orientation has increased over the past two decades,
with an inflection point that coincides with the 2008 financial crisis. 44 This growth indicates that
countries were already primed to see their borders as a means of defense, even before the risk of
transnational contagion emerged. Not only have border closures spread more quickly than the
virus did across borders, we are also seeing more unilateralism, and fewer attempts to coordinate
internationally than we did in previous historical eras. It is perhaps no wonder then that the

Data obtained from Carter and Poast 2015.
The resulting measure is approximately normal, with a mean centered near zero, and an approximate range of -3
to 3.
44
As Simmons and Kenwick (2020) demonstrate, this pattern persists for virtually every region in the world with the
exception of Western Europe.
42
43
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“post-Westphalian,” at-the-source responses Fidler (2004) associated with AIDS and SARS,
have given way to retrenchment.
Borders are focal for pandemic policy, since they are an “obvious” starting point for a
state to exert its authority. 45 Border controls satisfy the need to do something quickly, decisively,
and without raising questions of a state’s legitimate right to act. This is clearly not true for
actions taken by the WHO, 46 nor for internal regulations to stay home; witness the protests that
have sprung up around the United States but also in Europe, South Asia, Africa and the Middle
East. 47 Border controls inconvenience relatively few nationals, yet satisfy the need for the State
to appear to provide security. Meanwhile, border restrictions preserve (possibly fictitious) ideas
that the threat is foreign, the State is competent, and the domestic population is, and can be kept,
wholesome and healthy. For these reasons, border restrictions are attractive in a pandemic,
especially for states that have invested in the symbols and structures of control.

The international relations literature develops the idea of borders as focal point for purposes of making territorial
claims internationally. Goemans and Schultz 2016. Our argument suggests an analogous purpose for domestic
policy.
46
See Stephen Buranyi, “The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic.” The Guardian, April 10,
2020. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/apr/10/world-health-organization-who-v-coronaviruswhy-it-cant-handle-pandemic
47
For examples around the world where lock-down orders have been resisted see
https://www.factcheck.org/2020/05/u-s-isnt-the-only-country-with-lockdown-protests/.
45
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Figure 2: Average global border orientation is intensifying, 2000-2019. The figure shows estimates of border
orientation, a latent concept tapping state ability to project its authority to filter entry and exit at borders and
border crossings. Higher values correspond to an increased commitment to filtering at the border. Based on
satellite imagery of border crossings, documentation of border walls and fences, and the ratio of police stations in
30 km border zones to the rest of a country. Source: author’s database (Simmons and Kenwick, 2020).

Public Opinion: Demand from Within

While border orientation is a characteristic of states, it often has foundations in the fears
and anxieties of the public. How does mass opinion about border politics set the stage for
pandemic response? It is often much easier to sell domestic audiences externalized adjustments
through border restrictions than it is to sell to orders to cancel activities, social distance, and stay
at home. Not to mention those emasculating masks! 48 Publics experience many of the same
uncertainties and anxieties that their leaders do. In addition, they can readily be primed to accept

Teri Carter, “In my red state, people see masks as unmanly. That’s Trump’s fault.” Washington Post, June 1,
2020. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/01/red-states-like-mine-people-see-masks-unmanly-that’s trumps-fault/
48
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border closures by leaders who are incentivized to engage in blame avoidance by framing
pandemics as “foreign invasions.” 49 Under these conditions, externalization is likely to be an
easier sell than tough internal mitigation measures.
Available polls bear this out. Polls conducted in mid-March 2020 across 12 countries and
sampling 12,000 people show that significant majorities – some reaching 80% – support border
closures as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 3). Such high figures are surprising
given the wording of the question: “We should close the borders of [my country] and not allow
anyone in or out until the virus is proven to be contained.” (Emphasis added.) Sixty-two per cent
of Americans agreed with this statement, even though it was worded to include a self-restriction
(anyone). That proportion is about as high as support for border restrictions on migrants (not
citizens) right after the 9/11 attacks. 50 People appear to favor even stronger border restrictions in
the current pandemic than they were following the dramatic terrorist attacks in 2001.

Such framing is historically common and includes targeting foreign countries as well as disfavored domestic
minorities. See Charles Kenny, “Pandemics Close Borders – and Keep Them Closed.” Politico Magazine, March 25,
2020. Available at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/25/trump-coronavirus-borders-history-plague146788
50 For example, in three separate polls ranging between a month and six months after the 9/11 attacks, US residents
answered as follows to these analogous questions:
Question: Do you favor or oppose temporarily sealing US (United States) borders and stopping all immigration into
the US during the war on terrorism? 65% said yes.
Question: During the war on terrorism, do you favor or oppose each of the following measures?)... Sealing US
(United States) borders and stopping all immigration for up to two years while the search for terrorists is
conducted. 52% said yes.
Question: During the war on terrorism, do you favor or oppose each of the following measures?)... Sealing US
(United States) borders and stopping all immigration for up to two years while the search for terrorists is conducted.
48% said yes. Source: author’s database of polls administered in the United States on border security, various years
and pollsters.
49

16

Figure 3: Public Opinion in 12 Countries on Border Closure as a Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic,
March 12-14, 2020. Source: IPSOS. https://www.ipsos.com/en/majority-people-want-borders-closed-fearabout-covid-19-escalates.

At the time this poll was taken, mid-March 2020, the United States already had about
1,300 confirmed cases and 40 COVID-19 deaths within our borders. The virus was already
within US borders. Almost all scientifically informed advice was that it was imperative to
implement serous internal mitigation measures. Nonetheless, within three days of the poll, the
United States government closed the Mexican and Canadian land borders (despite lower
infection rates and deaths in those countries) to all non-essential traffic.
Extremely high majorities of the American public – about 8 out of 10 – favored travel
bans against China and Europe in late March of 2020. Fewer but still a majority supported school
closures and cancelling events, but of the 26% who said these internal measures were an over-
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reaction, nearly three-quarters still supported travel bans. 51 Despite clear evidence that the virus
was already in the US, as news of its spread mounted, more Americans favored travel bans than
domestic mitigation policies.
Of course, we do not view domestic attitudes about border restrictions as independent of
elite cues and national politics. The need to externalize can be stoked by divisive rhetoric and
nationalism. In some cases, public health policies become securitized 52 in familiar ways. War
allusions have peppered leaders’ speeches, from the Queen of England, 53 to the US President, 54
to the Secretary General of the United Nations. 55 Policy responses have in many cases displayed
traces of such militarized rhetoric. Arguably, the securitization of pandemic influenza since the
mid-1990s has resulted in policies “driven by national priorities and not the need for a coherent
global public health response” 56 among them, border closures especially by states whose
authority was already cast to enhance to border control.
In many countries, public opinion demands border protection in the face of the inherent
uncertainty pandemics bring. A growing number of states are prepared to accommodate these
fears with the authoritative symbols and structures of border security. The combination has
consequences for how states have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, as we illustrate below.

Rasmussen, “Poll: 8 in 10 Americans Support Travel Bans on China and Europe to Limit Coronavirus Spread.”
Available at https://www.peoplespunditdaily.com/polls/2020/03/18/8-in-10-americans-support-travel-bans-onchina-and-europe-to-limit-coronavirus-spread/.
52
On securitization theory see Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; Wæver 1995.
53
“Boris Johnson Hospitalized as Queen Urges British Resolve in Face of Epidemic” New York Times, April 5,
2020. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/world/europe/coronavirus-queen-elizabeth-speech.html.
54
“In coronavirus crisis, Trump says he is a 'wartime president.'” Washington Post, March 23, 2020. Video available
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/in-coronavirus-crisis-trump-says-he-is-a-wartime-presidentheres-what-thats-meant-in-the-past/2020/03/23/5eb1ef02-49cb-44b3-aa65-f35802166507_video.html
55
António Guterres, ninth Secretary-General of the United Nations, "This war needs a war-time plan to fight it."
March 20, 2020. Available at https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus/war-needs-war-time-plan-fight-it.
56
Kamradt-Scott and McInnes 2012, S107.
51
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III. Border Closures and COVID: An Empirical Investigation
The COVID pandemic has brought together the demand for protection from “foreign”
virus threats with the supply of authoritative investments at the border to torque policy responses
away from internal adjustments and toward externalization in the form of border closures. To
illustrate the plausibility of at least the supply half of this claim, we use border orientation as a
key explanatory variable, and rely on data provided by the Oxford COVID-19 Government
Response Tracker as the dependent variable. 57 This response tracker records information on
whether and when governments have enacted various policies to combat COVID-19. At present,
the data range from January 1 to June 17, 2020. While these data are clearly not suitable to make
broad claims about how the COVID-19 crisis will be resolved, they are uniquely suited to
exploring states’ initial responses.
We make use of two measures derived from these data. First, to identify measures
directed primarily toward foreign populations, we rely on the data set’s international travel
control indicator, which includes five ordered categories: no measures taken, screening,
quarantine arrivals from high-risk regions, ban on arrivals from some regions, and ban on all
regions or total border closures. While these measures impact both foreign populations and
citizens returning from abroad, they nevertheless approximate external control measures
implemented at international ports of entry. 58 Second, we construct a weighted average of the
internal measures countries take to mitigate the domestic spread of the virus. These include
school closures, workplace closures, cancellation of public events, restrictions on gatherings,
closure of public transport, stay at home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, and

Hale et al. (2020). Available at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-governmentresponse-tracker
58
Future research should relax this assumption and specifically test for distribution of expected costs by controlling
for external trade/travel dependence.
57
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public information campaigns. 59 Although the external control index is an ordinal five-point
scale and the internal control index is virtually continuous, we transform each to range from 0,
corresponding to minimum control, and 100, reflecting maximal controls. Comparing the
stringency of response across these two dimensions approximates the balance of policies a
country adopts that fall disproportionately on domestic and foreign populations.
Figure 4 displays the global mean values for internal and external control measures
across time. While these two variables are measured on separate scales, their relationship to each
other over time is telling. Countries responded to the global outbreak first with external controls,
and only secondarily with internal control measures. That these external controls were often
implemented at a time when the WHO recommended against their use further underscores the
return to at-the-border controls as pandemic response, perhaps reflecting the intensifying concern
about border security over past two decades. However, this might also reflect a reasonable
impulse to contain the virus before more painful mitigation strategies become necessary – after
all, studies have shown that to be effective restrictions such as travel bans must be early. 60 And
yet, some countries continued to ratchet up external controls even after containment had failed,
as did the United States at its land borders with Canada and Mexico. Figure 4 reveals that
countries have eased external controls more slowly than they have internal controls. This
evidence is consistent with the externalization processes described in the previous section—in
times of pandemic, there is an inclination to disproportionately implement costly policies that
affect international actors relative to domestic constituents.

The resulting measure is computed identically to the stringency index described in Hale et al. (2020) except that
we remove the travel control indicator, given our interest in differentiating between policies targeting domestic and
international populations.
60
See the studies reviewed in Bier 2020.
59
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Figure 4: External Control Measures are Implemented Faster and Last Longer
than Internal Control Measures. Note: Global means reported in bold lines, with
individual country time-series displayed in thin lines beneath. Stringency data
generated from Hale et al. (2020).

Our central claim is that pandemic policy is shaped by border politics. By this we mean,
by the prior degree of investment a country had previously made in bolstering its authoritative
presence at international land borders (border orientation). While virtually all countries have
now adopted some form of restrictions on international movement, they have varied considerably
both in the time it took them to implement these measures, and, crucially, the extent to which
they were paired with other policies to mitigate the spread of the virus internally (the policy
mix). The reason this is important is because studies show that border control do little more than
buy precious days to implement much more effective mitigation policies nationally.
Descriptively, border politics shape this critical mix: countries otherwise highly concerned with
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border security investments are faster in adopting controls that target foreign travel, but this
alacrity is not always mirrored domestically.
Figure 5 compares the average stringency of internal and external response measures to
2018 estimates of border orientation, with positive values corresponding to increased
commitment to filtering movement along international borders. Border orientation is more highly
correlated with the adoption of external measures (𝜌𝜌 =0.395) than it is with internal control
measures (𝜌𝜌 =0.184).

Figure 5: Border Orientation is More Strongly Associated with External Rather than Internal Control Measures
to Combat COVID-19. Note: Average stringency scores since January 1 reported on vertical axes. Border
orientation data obtained from Simmons and Kenwick (2020), stringency data generated from Hale et al. (2020).

The same pattern obtains over time. Figure 6 compares the average degree of internal and
external stringency across time. The left panel compares internal stringency to the days
preceding or since a country’s first confirmed death to adjust for the degree of exposure to the
virus. The right panel tracks calendar date since external measures are more responsive to the
global, rather than to domestic outbreak. In the latter case, countries with more controlling
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border orientations (displayed in red) implemented external controls more quickly and
maintained them for longer than countries with intermediate (black) or permissive (green) border
orientations. By contrast, there is less variation in the application of internal control measures
and here these countries were slightly slower to implement restrictions in the early days of the
virus, at least compared to countries with average border orientation scores.

Figure 6: Countries with Controlling Border Orientations Implement External Controls More Quickly
Relative to Internal Control Measures. Note: Border orientation scores above 0.56 displayed in red, below in
green, with intermediate scores in black. Bold lines report average stringency within each group. Border
orientation data obtained from Simmons and Kenwick (2020), stringency data generated from Hale et al. (2020).

Several mitigating factors complicate the interpretation of Figures 5 and 6, the most

obvious of which is that border orientation tends to covary with wealth. While there are notable
exceptions, richer countries tend to invest more to project control over their borders than do
lower income countries (Simmons and Kenwick 2020). It is therefore difficult to disentangle
whether some of the low-level responses observed among countries with permissive orientations
(i.e., the green lines in Figure 6) were driven by a lack of will, or a lack of capacity.
We therefore perform a simple regression analysis, reported in Table 1, to control for a
small set of potential confounders. The dependent variable is the average stringency of COVID
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response measures throughout the observation period, with average internal stringency reported
in models 1-4, and average external stringency in models 5-8. In addition to logged GDP per
capita we report models that control for a country’s liberal democracy score, and their logged
population. 61We also include a quadratic interaction term for GDP to account for the fact that
low-level responses to coronavirus have been observed at both low and high levels of the
development spectrum.
Table 1: Correlates of COVID-19 Stringency Measures
Dependent Variable
Border Orientation
Logged GDP Per Capita
Logged GDP Per Capita2
V-Dem Liberal Democracy
Logged Population
Adjusted R2
Observations

Stringency of Internal Measures
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1.977
-0.925
-0.550
-0.884
(1.309) (1.420)
(1.525)
(1.504)
26.452* 26.284* 26.827*
(6.829)
(6.974)
(6.850)
-1.464* -1.465* -1.498*
(0.393)
(0.406)
(0.399)
2.646
4.467
(4.611)
(4.593)
1.422*
(0.602)
0.0093
0.1151
0.1175
0.1494
137
132
127
127

Stringency of External Measures
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.328*
0.249*
0.240*
0.245*
(0.073)
(0.083) (0.089) (0.089)
0.986*
1.042*
1.030*
(0.398) (0.404) (0.405)
-0.058* -0.062* -0.061*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
0.191
-0.025
(0.266) (0.035)
0.157
(0.271)
0.1232
0.1551
0.1390
0.1354
138
133
128
128
Note: Intercepts omitted. *p<0.05

The results present a striking picture. Across all model specifications, countries with prior
investments projecting control over their borders were significantly more likely to implement
rigid external control measures in response to the virus than those without such preexisting
investments . By contrast, the relationship between border orientation and internal stringency is
never significant. Mirroring Figure 5, when border orientation is run in a bivariate regression
with the stringency of internal control measures, there is a positive, albeit insignificant

Data on GDP and population come from the World Bank (2019), while democracy is measured using the V-Dem
liberal democracy index (Coppedge et al. 2020). Population data are from 2019. We use 2017 GDP data due to slightly
more missingness in recent years.
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association. After controlling for wealth, however, the association actually becomes negative,
and remains so in all subsequent regressions. 62
That countries predisposed to displaying authority at their borders are more likely to
implement external restrictions is perhaps not surprising, but that these measures were not paired
with commensurate action at home points to two worrying possibilities. The first is that external
controls may be either explicitly or implicitly seen as policy substitutes, a regrettable conclusion
in a world where the coronavirus has already permeated virtually every border in the world. 63
Second is that border orientation may be associated with externalizing public health adjustment
costs onto foreigners, undermining beneficial transactions, stoking blame and reducing
possibilities for international cooperation in the future.
These results must be interpreted with caution—both the political and global health
environments are still in flux, and policy responses are rapidly evolving. Nevertheless, this
analysis was intended to characterize whether countries concerned with border security adopted
externalizing policy responses to COVID-19, and indeed this appears to be the case. Additional
testing is clearly necessary to isolate the causal mechanisms underlying these correlations and to
explore any possible impacts of doubling down on border security for the future of global
pandemic control.
IV. Conclusion:

The relationship between wealth and stringency is parabolic, with stringency highest among moderately rich states
and lower among both the poorest and the wealthiest. More research is necessary to confirm, but a possible
explanation may be that wealth is correlated with respect for civil liberties, which may sometimes clash with
perceptions of “authoritarian” restrictions on their freedom (“we are not China”). Low income countries have low
capacity to do any of these things. The apex of the parabola – the peak in the middle - may represent the conjunction
of preferences and means for internal control.
63
To be clear: we are not presenting these results as causal proof of policy substitution, which would require a much
more nuanced approach than presentation of two separate regressions.
62
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When responding to the H5N1 virus, then Senators Barack Obama and Richard Lugar
warned “exotic killer diseases are not isolated health problems half a world away, but direct and
immediate threats to security and prosperity here at home.” 64 How states respond to such “exotic
killers” impacts millions of lives world-wide. One hopes that these responses are informed by
science, but it is clear that they are formulated under uncertainty and shaped by fear. Leaders are
paramount in providing appropriate information and assuaging these fears. But our research
suggests that they are also likely to draw from some of the same narratives, symbols and
capabilities in which the state has invested in the past.
Pandemic responses are imbued with border politics. States that have invested heavily in
border security tend to want to redeploy those investments in fighting global pandemics. As we
have shown, border anxiety seems to be on the rise world-wide. Residents in some states seem
very willing to close borders before staying home, even though the virus is already spreading
domestically. Under these conditions, closing an international border may assuage some anxiety
at low personal cost.
We have argued that polities have latent traits that become manifest in their investments
in the built environment along international borders. This border orientation is associated with a
distinctive externally-focused response to pandemics. There is even some suggestive evidence
that it may be associated with policy substitution – the avoidance of more effective domestic
mitigation strategies. Much more research should be done to understand how narratives and
structures from past border investments and security debates play into public health responses.
The concept of border orientation is useful in this regard: it allows us to explore the extent to

Remarks of U.S. Senator Barack Obama, Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill and the Avian Flu, July 18,
2005. Available at http://obamaspeeches.com/026-Foreign-Operations-Appropriations-Bill-and-the-Avian-FluObama-Speech.htm.
64
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which states return to old scripts in the face of novel threats. Responses to this particular crisis
may have been shaped as much by pre-existing anxieties than by scientific innovation. The
concept of border orientation gives special insights into these choices.
Two broader points can be made about what scholars of international relations can learn
about international borders from this global public health crisis. First, borders are not going away
anytime soon. Long before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, many scholars were grappling
with the rise and apparent demise of globalization and its ramifications for the broader study of
global politics and the neoliberal international order. 65 While it is too soon to make firm
declarations about the full impact of the coronavirus pandemic, it seems to have accelerated
trends toward border hardening that pre-date COVID-19. While the increased pace of movement
wrought by globalization may one day return, it appears that the current pandemic has hastened
movement away from international cooperation and reinvigorated a my-nation-first approach.
Second, we suggest that in addition to the traditional study of interstate border claims,
researchers should view international borders as a potential domestic political resource. The
current crisis shows how convenient it is, and how well it resonates politically, to assure
domestic audiences that national leaders are taking prudent measures to protect them while
minimizing the impact on daily life. International border politics is a useful tool in this regard.
Clearly, border policies are at the nexus of comparative and international politics, involve
security as well as political economy concerns, and require both objective data as well as
intersubjective concepts to begin to properly understand.

65
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